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Abstract
I argue for an overlooked distinction between perceptual presence and volumetric content,
and flesh it out in terms of predictive processing. Within the predictive processing frame-
work we can distinguish between agent-active and object-active expectations. The former
expectations account for perceptual presence, while the latter account for volumetric content.
I then support this position with reference to how experiences of presence are created by
virtual reality technologies, and end by reflecting on what this means for the relationship
between sensorimotor enactivism and predictive processing.
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1 Sensorimotor contingencies and volumetric content
Consider the following, which we might call “the puzzle of volumetric content”. When
I see a tomato, I typically see it as three-dimensional: a roughly spherical object with a
rear surface that is occluded from view. How is it that my experience has this
volumetric, three-dimensional content given that all that is actually presented to me
are the surfaces of the tomato that are facing me?1 The account that Alva Noë (e.g.
O’Regan and Noë 2001; Noë 2004) gives is that I have certain embodied expectations
about how the visual sensorium would change if I were to act in certain ways.
Crucially, these are expectations that are contingent on my actions (hence the term
“sensorimotor contingencies”). According to this account, without these embodied
action-based expectations, I would not be able to experience the tomato as three-
dimensional. Here is one of many passages where Noë presents this view.
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Our perceptual sense of the tomato’s wholeness – of its volume and backside, and
so forth – consists in our implicit understanding (our expectation) that movements
of our body to the left or right, say, will bring further bits into view. Our relation
to the unseen bits of the tomato is mediated by patterns of sensorimotor contin-
gency (Noë 2004, p. 63).
It is certainly true that what I am presented with underdetermines the volumetric
content of my experience. For example, a tomato that’s been hollowed out at the back
would impact on my nervous system in the same way. Indeed, assuming monocular
vision, a very realistic two-dimensional tomato façade could do the same. Furthermore,
Noë is surely right that one promising way of building up from the sparseness of what
is sensorially presented is through the notion of expectations (which reflect an “implicit
understanding”). However, should these expectations be restricted to how the sensori-
um would change if I were to act in certain ways? Sure, one might argue, expectations
about how the sensorium would change if the object itself were to move in certain ways
(with me staying put) are as important, or indeed more so. Thus, if the tomato were
spinning on a turntable, the expectation of what I’m about to see, as previously unseen
parts of the tomato come into view, would be central to my experience of the tomato as
a three-dimensional object. Furthermore, it seems that the cases where my expectations
involve my acting are only tangentially to do with my action. They are, at least
fundamentally, about the bringing of unseen parts of the object into view, regardless
of whether this is about my moving around the object, or the object’s rotating on its
own. Such a criticism has been put forward by Cavedon-Taylor (2011). In his words,
Noë wrongly prioritizes “agent-active sensorimotor expectations”, when he should be
prioritizing “object-active” ones.
In this paper, I want to show how a recent way of fleshing out Noë’s view in terms of
predictive processing not only addresses Cavedon-Taylor’s criticisms, but also allows
for a very neat distinction that Noë’s view cannot accommodate. This distinction is
between perceptual presence on the one hand, and volumetric content on the other.
These two things are unfortunately often conflated. An upshot of this is that predictive
processing doesn’t simply flesh out Noë’s account: it accommodates its core insights
and improves upon it.
2 A predictive processing account of sensorimotor contingencies
Seth (2014) has re-cast sensorimotor contingencies in terms of the predictive processing
framework (PPF) (Friston 2005; Clark 2013; Hohwy 2013). According to this frame-
work, we perceive the world not in virtue of our nervous systems taking inputs from the
world and constructing a percept, but in virtue of them generating models of the world,
based on how well these models predict imminent sensory input. These models
correspond to our experience of the world, and if they do a good job of predicting
sensory input, they are kept. If not, and then they generate too much prediction error,
they are updated or discarded. This is often put in terms of the brain being fundamen-
tally in the business of minimizing prediction error.
On this framework, it is not just volumetric content that is underdetermined by
sensory input. All perceptual experience, to the extent that it is determined by the model
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selected to predict future sensory input, is underdetermined by sensory input. Many
predictive models are compatible with any given input. What helps with model
selection in the face of this multiple compatibility is background knowledge about
the probability of the model independently of the input, namely, its “prior probability”.
(This is why the PPF is often seen as a fundamentally Bayesian approach.) Crucially,
the predictive models that our nervous systems generate include ourselves as part of the
world, and how our acting on and in the world will impact on our sensory (and
proprioceptive) input.
Seth presents the connection between the PPF and sensorimotor contingencies as
follows. The models that our nervous systems select, and which determine our expe-
rience, vary in their counterfactual richness (see also Friston et al. 2012). What he
means by this is that my nervous system doesn’t simply have expectations about what
is going to happen, namely, how the sensorium will change given what is likely to
happen in the near future. There is also (at least in the human brain) a wealth of
counterfactual expectation about how the sensorium would change given relevant
circumstances – circumstances that needn’t happen and may even be unlikely to
happen. In other words, my nervous system isn’t simply “content” with superficially
predicting what will happen next, but seeks to “comprehend” more fully the statistical
structure of the world, which involves, in part, the tacit positing of the underlying
natures and dispositions of things, even if those natures and dispositions are never
explicitly revealed, since their being revealed might involve an excessively complicated
and/or unlikely set of counterfactual circumstances.2 This more costly enterprise clearly
amounts to a wise long-term investment, since it prepares you for a causally complex
and hard-to-predict world.
A crucial aspect of this picture, which I’ve briefly mentioned, is that
predictive models aren’t just about the world, but include ourselves as part of
that world. Indeed, bodily action is explained within this framework as a self-
fulfilling prediction. More specifically, it involves the expectation that certain
body-involving sensory and proprioceptive events will take place, which is then
fulfilled by the ensuing action. In a way that is very much in keeping with
Noë’s view, exploratory touch can be seen as a nicely illustrative case of
perception and how it is fundamentally continuous with action: the movement
of my arm and hand as I reach out in the dark to feel something is transparent
since the expectations are being effortlessly fulfilled, and a model of the distal
object is constructed as parts of the world with which I am less familiar, have
less control over, are encountered and generate prediction error that needs to be
accommodated.
With these two ingredients in place, namely, (i) the counterfactual depth of predic-
tive models, and (ii) the deployment of predictive models that feature ourselves as part
of the world, our nervous system has an implicit understanding of sensorimotor
contingencies insofar as it deploys predictive models about how the sensorium will
change if I were to act in certain ways (even if those ways of acting are unlikely).
As Seth puts it,
2 The scare quotes around “content” and “comprehend” are meant to signal that this is metaphorical. Only
entire organisms are literally capable of being content and of comprehending things – not nervous systems. I
feel that the utility of these non-literal ways of speaking far outweighs any confusion that may arise.
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Extending this idea, counterfactually-rich generative models explicitly encode the
conditional nature emphasized by the mastery of sensorimotor contingencies
relevant to the puzzle of perceptual presence. That is, a counterfactually-rich
hierarchical generative model explicitly encodes probabilistic representations of
the external causes and expected values and precisions of the fictive sensations
conditioned on repertoire of possible actions, thus capturing the key notion within
sensorimotor theory of somehow perceiving parts of an object not directly
available within ongoing sensory flux. (Seth 2014, p.106)
Seth goes on to use these ideas to explain why sensory experiences in synesthesia lack
perceptual presence. In short, the story goes, it is because the sensations do not change
in a coherent manner conditional on the subject’s actions, and therefore a real-world
external cause is not posited by the nervous system. A similar story, of course, could be
told about far less exotic phenomena, such as retinal afterimages, but the point is
especially powerfully made in the case in synesthesia.3
3 Volumetric content vs. perceptual presence
How can it be true, as I think it is, that we are perceptually aware, when we look
at a tomato, of parts of the tomato which, strictly speaking, we do not perceive.
This is the puzzle of perceptual presence. (Noë 2006, p. 414, emphasis added)
From this representative passage we can see that Noë thinks of, at least what he is
calling, “the puzzle of perceptual presence” as the very same problem as the
problem that I am calling “the puzzle of volumetric content”. But here is an
importantly different puzzle, one which I think is more suited to being called
“the puzzle of perceptual presence”. When I see a tomato, I don’t only see its
facing surfaces, nor indeed do I only see it as three-dimensional; I also see it as
present, namely, as part of the world that I inhabit. Again, sensory input
underdetermines my experience of the tomato as present. I could after all experi-
ence it as an elaborate and ultra-realistic hallucination, an endogenous product of
my brain that might, for example, stay in the same part of my visual field
regardless of where I looked (like some sort of highly complicated and vivid
after-image). In short, seeing something as part of my world is quite different to
seeing it as three-dimensional, although both are underdetermined by current
sensation. Where does this experience of presence come from?
Before answering this question, let’s clarify still further the relevant notion of
perceptual presence and how it differs from, and can even come apart from,
volumetric content. I can perceive a two-dimensional tomato façade as present,
although I need not experience it as three-dimensional. Conversely, I might have
as my screensaver an animation of a rotating tomato. There is an important sense
in which I experience the tomato as three-dimensional, as having volumetric
3 Ward (2012) gives a nice explanation, in terms of sensorimotor contingencies, of why synaesthetic colours
don’t adapt away. This account could be very nicely fleshed out with predictive processing.
S. Wilkinson
content, but, I do not thereby experience it as having presence (I do however
experience the monitor it’s on as having perceptual presence).
I want to suggest a very simple solution to both puzzles that falls quite naturally out
of the PPF. Borrowing Cavedon-Taylor’s (2011) distinction between object-active and
agent-active expectations, I want to say the following. Whereas object-active expecta-
tions generate volumetric content (experiences of three-dimensionality), agent-active
expectations generate perceptual presence (experiences of things as part of my world).
On this account, the experience of the screensaver tomato has volumetric content
because I have certain (in this case accurate) object-active expectations about how
the sensorium will change as the virtual tomato rotates. However, it lacks perceptual
presence because I don’t have the relevant agent-active expectations about the tomato.
In fact, I have expectations that contradict presence, e.g., that if I were to walk around it
(or rather where it is represented as being), all I would see is, first, an unrealistic
foreshortening of the tomato from round to oblong as I see my computer screen from an
angle, and then, as I continue round, the back on my monitor. While the tomato on the
screen is experienced as having volumetric content but not perceptual presence, the
monitor itself of course is experienced as having both.
At this point I’d like to clarify object-active expectations still further, by in particular
clarifying their relationship to action.4 In the wild, so to speak, three-dimensional inanimate
objects tend not to spontaneously rotate. Our exposure to the occluded surfaces of objects is
usually through our action, e.g. walking around the object. This observation in no way
contradicts my point about object-active expectations, since this in not about how these
expectations are acquired, but about what they fundamentally are once acquired, namely,
expectations generated by models about the object. As mobile, embodied agents it makes
perfect sense that these object-active expectations, and ultimately our generative models for
objects, should be acquired through exploratory action. Once acquired, however, they
pertain to the object, not to our actions in relation to the object. This is indeed why, even
if ecologically unusual, experiencing, say, an apple as three-dimensional rather than flat, or
indeed whole rather than with a bite out of the back, includes expectations about how the
sensorium would change if the apple itself were to rotate and we stood still. Our volumetric
appreciation of the apple is at play when occluded surfaces come into viewwithout surprise,
regardless of whether this coming into view is achieved by walking around the object, or the
object itself rotating. The difference between these two modes of bringing our volumetric
appreciation into play is that the former, action-involving one also necessarily involves an
appreciation of presence, whereas the latter can involve presence but needn’t (as the rotating
screensaver illustrates).
This under-appreciated distinction between volumetric content and perceptual pres-
ence, and the different kinds of expectations that underpin the two, offers Noe a way
out of Cavedon-Taylor’s criticism: Noe was talking about perceptual presence, not
about volumetric content, and it is the former, and not the latter, that is underpinned by
sensorimotor contingencies. However, this is unsatisfying for two reasons. First, it is
not clear that Noe is restricting himself to perceptual presence in this more specific
sense (see the passage at the start of this section). Second, even if we grant that he is,
surely we want to be able to accommodate both perceptual presence and volumetric
content? I now present account that does just that.
4 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for prompting me to make this clarification.
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4 Beyond sensorimotor contingencies
It is crucial to see that not all counterfactual predictions are about what would happen were I
to do something. Many of the relevant expectations are to do with what will happen to the
object in certain circumstances that need not involve my acting at all (although of course
they may). So here we get the distinction between object-active and agent-active expecta-
tions. These expectations, although they are responsible for generating volumetric content
and perceptual presence respectively, in being responsible for all experiential content, go
well beyond that. They may, for example, generate the experience that something is fragile
(It would smash if dropped; an object-active expectation) or edible (I could pick it up and eat
it; an agent-active affordance-based expectation) and so on.
So what story does this framework generate for volumetric content and perceptual
presence respectively? Let’s return to the rotating tomato screensaver. As the tomato
rotates, bringing the back of the tomato into view, the model that my nervous system
adopts in order to best predict imminent inputs is that there is an object with a certain
shape and volume occupying Euclidean space.5 There is no need, at least when we’re
purely considering volumetric content, to model myself or my potential actions.
For perceptual presence – for example, with a real tomato on the table in front ofme –my
nervous system selects a model that underpins my embodied appreciation (my “implicit
understanding”) that, among other things, as I move around the tomato, previously unseen
parts of the tomato will come into view. In short, my nervous system has generated the
optimally predictivemodel that there is an object there in relation tome. It is, likeme andmy
body, a part of my world, the world that I can navigate through and act upon.
So, to sum up, then, within the PPF we are to understand the nervous system as
fundamentally engaged in the selection of optimally predictive models, and these
models determine the content of our experience at a given time. When our experience
contains a three-dimensional object, that three-dimensionality (taken, for theoretical
purposes, in isolation) is best explained in terms of our nervous system having selected
a model for the object; it models the object to the extent that it exploits object-centred
counterfactual expectations. That very same experience may (and usually will) also
have presence in its content, namely, the object is experienced as part of my world. This
quite different feature of the experience is best explained in terms of my nervous system
having selected a model for the overall encounter, namely, for the object in relation to
me; it exploits agent-centred counterfactual expectations, namely, sensorimotor contin-
gencies. The relevant expectations concern how the sensorium will change if I were to
act in certain ways (even if I am highly unlikely, or even unable, to do so).
5 Creating presence in virtual reality
One way of putting this account to the test is to examine the ways in which experiences
of presence can be created with virtual reality (VR) technologies. In VR research,
5 Note that a rotating cube works better than something spherical (since sensory inputs change more drastically
contingent on the rotation of a cube than of a sphere – indeed a perfect sphere that is uniformly coloured ought
not to be subject to detectable rotation). Note also that the ambiguous Necker cube gets a very neat treatment
here: the two working hypotheses (namely, where the left-most square is seen as either the outer front side, or
the inner back side) entail different counterfactual predictions contingent on motion of the (hypothetical) cube.
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presence refers to the extent to which a virtual (i.e. non-actual) environment (VE) is
experienced as an actual environment that the subject is spatiotemporally located
within. The VE usually takes the form of a computer-generated pictorial representation
presented to the subject via a head-mounted display (HMD). The ambiguity in the word
“presence” of what it is that is present turns out to be rather apt. That is because it refers
simultaneously to the presence of the subject in the environment, and the presence of
the environment to the subject. In short, presence is a two-way relation between subject
and environment. If I experience the environment as present to me, I thereby experience
myself as present in the environment.
It has long been acknowledged that what generates experiences of presence in VR is
sensorimotor contingencies (viz. agent-active expectations) (Slater and Wilbur 1997).
For example, where the VE involves the subject standing in front of a precipice, the
better the calibration (the better the coherence and the smaller the delay) between head
movement and visual display updating, the greater the experience of presence (as
measured by increased heart rate) (Meehan et al. 2003). Furthermore, agent-active
expectation is not merely one of a number of ingredients, which, other things being
equal, increases the experience of presence. It seems to be the main determinant of
experienced presence. For example, the visual realism of the display plays only an
enabling role (viz. it is only relevant to the extent that it can support sensorimotor
contingencies). To illustrate this point, if you compare a very realistic, high-resolution,
three-dimensional environment presented from a first-person perspective that you
navigate with a joystick or handheld controller, with a relatively unrealistic, low-
resolution environment that you navigate by moving your head, so that the scene pans
across your visual field from left to right as you move your head from right to left, and
vice versa, it is the latter, which, in spite of its low resolution, is more “immersive”,
namely, generates a far stronger experience of presence. Not only this, but in cases
where the sensorimotor contingencies are generated and the only variable is the realism
and resolution of the visual display, experienced presence doesn’t seem to increase in
line with better resolution (for example, there was no rise in the rate of heart-rate
increase depending of whether the precipice was realistic or not (Zimmons and Panter
2003)). In other words, once the visual display crosses a minimal threshold where it
enables sensorimotor contingencies, any further increases in realism or resolution are
superfluous, at least as far as generating the experience of presence is concerned.
Much more effective in enhancing presence are the addition of subtle movements of
the virtual visual field that mimic the movements of walking, and are calibrated to the
subject’s actual walking (Slater et al. 1995). Another obvious sensory consequence of
action is involved in the perception of one’s own body, e.g. when you lift your hand in
front of your face and look at it. It has been shown that experienced presence can be
greatly enhanced if, in addition to how the view of the environment changes as one
moves (e.g. one’s head) one also adds a representation of the subject’s body, and
especially limbs, that move in line with the subject’s actual limb movement (Slater and
Usoh 1994). For example, the subject sees an arm in front of her face when she actually
lifts her arm in front of her face (and the virtual arm might then rotate as the subject
rotates her arm). This clearly requires the VR system to detect and virtually reproduce
the subject’s actual movement (something VR technology has been able to do for some
time). This further enhancement of presence supports the close connection between
presence, action and embodiment. It also gets very simply and effectively accounted for
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within the PPF. For example, as I hold my hand in front of my face and the HMD
shows me a hand (which can deviate in appearance quite considerably from my actual
hand) I might then rotate my hand (e.g. to show myself the back instead of the palm),
and if the display is well calibrated, I will experience the hand both as present and
three-dimensional (and as mine).
So much for VR and presence; what about volumetric content? If my suggestion is
correct, VR is not necessary for experiences of volumetric content, since what the
HMD provides is exploitation of agent-active expectations, not the object-active ones
that underpin three-dimensionality. This seems, on reflection, to be an accurate suppo-
sition. Rudimentary experiences of three-dimensionality can be achieved through
perspective (think of a trompe-l’oeil) and, as discussed, rotation. More sophisticated
and immersive forms of three-dimensionality exploit the depth cues that binocular
vision provides (see fn. 1), viz., 3D glasses give each eye a slightly different image,
namely, the image as it would be from a slightly different location, namely from the
location of each eye. This means that a relatively large disparity between the two
images corresponds to experiences of proximity, whereas a relatively small disparity
corresponds to experiences of distance. This does not exploit action. You get this effect
while sitting perfectly still. Indeed, moving your head actually disturbs the effect of 3D
glasses since the depth cues don’t vary as they ought to. Having said this, if they did,
and you combined VR and 3D, it would add fuller presence to the experience.
Again, a point of clarification is required here. 3D glasses do generate illusions of
presence as well as three-dimensionality, and the urge to reach out and touch the
Tyrannosaurus Rex (for example) is testament to that. The illusion, however, is fragile,
and movement destroys it rather than strengthening it. But this is perfectly in keeping
with the distinction I am trying to sketch. Agent-active expectations are invoked by the
careful recreation of embodied binocular vision that 3D glasses (and the appropriate
image) provide. But these expectations are broken when movement doesn’t generate
the expected sensory change. At the same time, of course, object-active expectations
are also broken yielding a loss of volumetric content, as discussed. As the T-Rex’s head
appears to jut out of the screen (let’s suppose head-on), if you try (by moving) to look at
it from the side, your nervous system will be disappointed, and your 3D generative
model of the T-Rex (as a 3D object) will collapse, since the image projected on the
cinema screen won’t change to show you the dinosaur in profile simply for your benefit
(it will also, more subtly but beforehand, fail to retain the carefully recreated binocular
disparity that 3D technology exploits).
6 Sensorimotor Enactivism and predictive processing
In spite of appearances, I don’t think that what I have said here is bad news for Noë’s
sensorimotor enactivism. Noë’s view is that our conscious perceptual experience is
determined by sensorimotor contingencies, by what I have here called agent-active
expectations. To the extent that our perceptual experience is about perceiving the world
around us and perceiving it as around us, what I have said leaves the core of Noë’s
sensorimotor enactivism intact. In that respect it’s a defense of Noë against the criticism
put forward by Cavedon-Taylor, but one that elucidates the notion of presence. And
although in theory Cavedon-Taylor is right that it isn’t agent-active expectations that
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generate volumetric content, in practice it is hard to separate volumetric content from
presence in an experience that is to be genuinely thought of as perceptual (after all, I
don’t literally perceive a tomato in the screensaver example: I perceive the monitor and
its screen). Perhaps more importantly, it is hard to conceive of a conscious, embodied
organism that wasn’t constantly making use of sensorimotor expectations to at least
some extent. In a related manner, when I talk about volumetric content independently
of perceptual presence, this is a theoretical abstraction that never occurs in practice, at
least not for embodied organisms (and these are the beings in the universe that perceive
and have need to do so). It is nevertheless a theoretical distinction that is worth making
since it points to two different components of experience that can be manipulated
separately (albeit in unecological circumstances). Certain vivid after-images, or rotating
screensavers, might have relatively high levels of three-dimensionality, but low levels
of presence. Some low-resolution VR experience might have the opposite: high
presence, but low three-dimensionality.
Finally, I’d like to gesture towards two ways in which sensorimotor enactivism and
predictive processing are not only compatible, but also deeply similar in spirit. The
(related) things that they share (and there a likely more) are as follows.
First, both the PPF and sensorimotor enactivism explicitly think of perception as, to
quote Noë, “a thoughtful activity.” It’s not about passively receiving “impressions” of
the world, but of actively making sense of the world. Second, both the PPF and
sensorimotor enactivism, when compared to more orthodox views of perception, play
down the importance of sensory stimulation for perceptual experience. To clarify, both
entail that my perceptual experience at t1 is not determined by (or worse, constructed
out of) antecedent sensory stimulation. It is rather, for both views, determined by
patterns of expectation, which may be fulfilled or frustrated. The role of sensation for
both views is always as a corrective after the experience itself, which is profoundly
dynamic. Of course, these expectations are cashed out within the PPF as “models” or
“hypotheses”, which is a move sensorimotor enactivists are likely to resist, but that is a
question for another day (see Downey 2018).
7 Conclusion
In this paper I have presented a distinction between perceptual presence, on the one
hand, and volumetric content, on the other, and fleshed it out in terms of predictive
processing. Whereas presence is underpinned by what Cavedon-Taylor (2011) calls
agent-active expectations, volumetric content is underpinned by object-active expecta-
tions. Within a predictive processing framework, the former expectations are generated
by a predictive model that centrally involves the agent and their relationship to the
object (or environment more generally). The latter expectations, in contrast, are gener-
ated by models of the object, by how the agent’s nervous system takes the object to be,
regardless of its actual, real location in relation to the agent. Although this model of the
object may have been constructed in a way that makes use of exploratory action, the
model itself does not centrally involve action in the way that it does for perceptual
presence. I have supported this distinction by using a number of examples, including
examples from VR, and, finally, reflected on commonalities between sensorimotor
enactivism and predictive processing.
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